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ABSTRACT
Cloud computing and, in particular, cloud databases are useful tools providing flexibility for enterprise’s IT
infrastructure. But usage of such technology may lead to privacy issues because users have to entrust to
cloud services. In this paper we propose a solution for secured cloud database without significant limitations.
Our approach is based on usage of following functional elements: SQL-queries and response processors,
cryptographic metadata storage and variety of encryption algorithms. Usage of different encryptions like
order-preserving and homomorphic allows performing resource-intensive computations on cloud server on
encrypted data. SQL-queries processor transforms user’s queries into a secured form, analyzing query and
encrypting vulnerable data. Response processor decrypts a secured data in database’s response and converts it to
a suitable for user form. Cryptographic metadata storage provides access to encryption keys. Architecture with
detailed description of components and theirs interaction’s principles will be presented. Our approach has been
validated by an implementation of a prototype and its integration with WordPress Content Management System.
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1. Introduction
Rapid growth and development of cloud technologies has leaded
them to popularity and wide spread usage. Although customers
are excited by cloud features and benefits, they are very con-
cerned about confidentiality of data stored and processed in a
cloud. Insider threats combined with a general lack of trans-
parency into provider process and procedure has dropped confi-
dence in security of cloud data storage [1].
Data confidentiality is highly important for Cloud Databases
(Database as a Service, DbaaS), and there are threats of disclo-
sure of vulnerable user’s data to unauthorized parties. First of
all, curious and malicious database administrators may capture
or leak data [3]. Also a theft of database may possibly occur,
leaving data in hands of a malefactor [4].
Listed problems are still actual [2], and as a result multiple
solutions to problem of trusting clouds have been developed. En-
cryption of all data in remote database was offered as a method
of providing provable confidentiality [5, 6]. But such an ap-
proach demands all operations will be held on a client side after
decryption of database content. Other solutions such as MIT
CryptDB [7], lack fully homomorphic encryptions and use third-
party encryptions with relatively low crypto strength and known
vulnerabilities [8].
To address listed cloud security issues we designed secure
cloud database architecture, several encryption algorithms and
a SQL data encoding component. Proposed solution addresses
mentioned challenges using following key ideas:
1. Incoming queries are processed in secured form by a
trusted proxy server. No encryption keys are passed to
untrusted database or leaves trusted area in other way.
2. Usage of wide variety of order preserving and fully ho-
momorphic encryptions. All encryptions that are used in
proposed solution are proprietary developed encryptions
with relatively high speed and provable crypto strength.
3. All resource-intensive operations except encryption and
decryption are performed in a cloud on encrypted data
without decryption step due to used encryption algorithms.
In this paper we present upgraded and extended version of
solution described in [10], its work’s principles, design, SQL
queries’ processing and security of cryptographic metadata stor-
age.
The next section of paper gives an introduction into princi-
ples solution’s functioning cycle and depicts main idea of SQL
queries handling. Next, Section 3 describes the architecture of
proposed solution, also summary for each component is given.
SQL-queries processor and cryptographic metadata storage’s
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principles are explained in the Sections 4 and 5 correspondingly.
Section 6 gives some insight into encryptions, which are used
in secure SQL queries processing. Finally, the last section sum-
marizes all achievements of proposed secured cloud database
concept.
2. Basic Principles
In this Section basic principles are discussed illustrating main
idea of secure cloud database. Core component of proposed
secure cloud database is SQL-queries processor. All user’s SQL
queries are analyzed and transformed by program components in
trusted area before sending to DBMS (see Figure 1). Similarly,
all replies from database are processed.
Figure 1. Overview.
Also, encryption of data, extracted from user’s queries, is a
responsibility of SQL-query processing component. Proposed
solution doesn’t require any modifications on DBMS side.
User’s SQL query handling is shown on Figure 2. Infor-
mation about encrypted columns such as encryption keys and
encrypted column name(s) is needed in order to parse, decrypt
and reconstruct user queries.
Figure 2. Query processing.
When user retrieves data from a cloud database, selection
of column comes as a reply from DBMS. Information about
encrypted columns is needed to decrypt and present selected
data to user in suitable form (see Figure 3).
Figure 3. Data selection processing.
Basic idea of SQL-queries processing is explained on differ-
ent types of SQL expressions below. “CREATE” statement is
the only statement in terms of proposed secure cloud database,
which may contain additional keywords, which are not included
in SQL language. These keywords are markers of different en-
cryptions applied to table columns. To indicate that column in
currently created table should be encrypted, user should add a
constraint corresponding to encryption’s marker (identification
string).
If SQL-queries processing component encounters encryp-
tion marker, following steps will be performed. First, encryp-
tion’s keys are generated or chosen. Next, based on encryption
information, number (can be more than one, in case when the
result of encryption is a vector of multiple values), names, types
and constraints of output columns are determined. Correct SQL
string is created according to determined information. After that
modified statement is sent to DBMS. Output names of encrypted
columns are anonymized, while anonymization of table name is
optional (anonymization means changing real names of column
to generated ones).
Processing of SQL statements such as “INSERT”, “SE-
LECT”, “DELETE” uses common principles. All data from
query are extracted and data from encrypted columns are en-
crypted. Also names of columns, which values are encrypted
and used in processed statement, are modified according to their
anonymized names. In some cases (for example, homomorphic
encryption) changes in mathematical operation can be made.
Responses for “SELECT” queries from database are decrypted
if needed.
Correctness of performing “JOIN” operation inside DBMS
depends on encryption properties. If encryption is deterministic,
output column is single and both columns from each joining
tables, have same key, no additional mechanisms are needed to
perform “JOIN” operation. It is very important to understand
that some restrictions may apply to using full functionality of
SQL language and different DBMS specific structures due to
fact that proposed solution targets multi DBMS support, also
various constraints can be caused by using order preserving or
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fully homomorphic encryption.
One of the restrictions is limited usage of “ALTER TA-
BLE” construction. As long as table altering doesn’t affect
encrypted columns, it can be performed, but adding or removing
encryption from already existing table is unsupported. Another
restriction is incompatibility of encryptions with several column
constraints (e.g. “FOREIGN KEY”).
This concludes basics principles and mechanisms of SQL-
queries processing in discussed approach. Main idea is to per-
form query analysis and modification, which include encryption
of vulnerable user’s data on client side, without affecting DBMS
or adding any intermediate components.
3. Architecture
This section gives an insight into each component of the pre-
sented solution. Cloud DBMS remains unmodified; all other
components are located in trusted area, as it shown in Figure 4.
Basic principle is to intercept queries for secured database
and its responses, modify and send them to the destination. For
this proxy server is used as an intermediate component between
user and DBMS. This component is responsible for following
functions:
1. Intercepting user’s queries, modifying them via SQL pro-
cessor and sending encrypted queries to secured database.
2. Intercepting DBMS’s responses, decrypting them using
Response processor and forwarding decrypted responses
to users.
3. Handling of user’s authorization in cryptographic meta-
data storage.
Second part is SQL-queries processor. Its main purpose is to
convert user’s query using cryptographic metadata storage and
encryption algorithms and so it can be performed on secured
data in database. Basic principle of processing is to find columns
used in query and check if metadata storage contains information
about them or that there are keywords specifying encryptions
in processed query. After that SQL processor changes this
column on their anonymous names, encrypts values used with
column in operations and transforms operations into secured
form. Mechanism of SQL queries’ processing is better described
in Section 4.
Next observed basic component is Database response’s pro-
cessor. Its main purpose is to detect encrypted columns in
response, combine them (when multiple output columns corre-
spond to single initial column), and to decrypt data to display
them in suitable form to user. This module actively interacts
with Cryptographic metadata storage, in order to correctly de-
crypt and modify response.
Cryptographic metadata storage is responsible for storing
information supporting SQL queries and DBMS replies proces-
sors. Among service information, the following values are kept
in this storage:
• crypto keys for encryption of data in column
• map of real name of the column to anonymized names
matching vector of encrypted values
• types of encryption used for column
• names of tables, where encrypted columns are located
Cryptographic metadata storage is an interface for retrieving
and adding information about encrypted columns. It’s mecha-
nism is shown in Section 5.
Encryptions interfaces module provides two interfaces —
“Key” and “Encoder”. These interfaces define a set of proper-
ties required for encryptions’ correct work and interaction with
other components. Due to “Encoder” and “Key” interfaces ar-
chitecture and realization of entire solution does not depends on
specific encryptions and is open to integration with other crypto
algorithms.
Arithmetic operations on encrypted values may be repre-
sented with some specific form depended on algorithm. That is
why algorithm must be considered in transforming of operations
with secured data.
Each encryption is able to perform fixed subset of opera-
tions (plus, multiplication, comparing etc...). Hence operation
with secured data’s conversion in SQL-queries processor must
consider for operation and encryption’s compatibility.
4. SQL-queries Processor
Current section introduces in SQL-queries processor’s mecha-
nism shown in Figure 5.
SQL-queries processor’s main objective is modification of
incoming queries, which consists of following steps:
1. First step is to parse not-secured query and build abstract
syntax tree (AST) of query where each node corresponds
to an operation.
2. After parsing Processor searches for secured columns
which have records in cryptographic metadata storage.
Simultaneously, Processor checks for correct usage of
secured data within construction. For example there is
no way to use columns with different specified encryp-
tions in one arithmetic operation. Additionally, it must be
checked if operation cannot be implemented on secured
data depending on encryption. As an example a plus-
operation cannot be performed if encryption algorithm is
not additively homomorphic.
3. When all secured columns and used with them values
are found, they are changed on generated anonymous
columns’ names and encrypted value, accordingly. Oper-
ations are converted to secured form. Transformed opera-
tion from AST’s root corresponds to secured query.
While “CREATE TABLE” query is processed newly created
secured columns marked with keyword specifying encryption
42
A. Sumaneev et al. / International Journal of Computer Science: Theory and Application
Figure 4. Solution’s architecture..
Figure 5. SQL-queries processor’s functioning.
may be found. This secured columns demands metadata for
correct usage of them. Therefore, SQL-query processor retrieves
data from query which is column name, column’s table name,
column’s type and encryption algorithm specified by marker to
create new record in cryptographic metadata storage.
On the contrary, “DROP TABLE” query removes table from
database. So all records in storage associated with dropped table
will be erased.
For example, user issues the following query:
CREATE TABLE tbl (id INT),
(price INT enc ord NOT NULL)
(count INT encr homomorphic)
CHECK (price≥0)
Column definition of id column will not be modified because
there is no secure marker specified. In second definition proces-
sor will find keyword for order-preserving encryption and add
new record in cryptographic metadata storage for price column
where names and types of encrypted column will be generated
by encryption type. Processed definition looks like
(encr price 0 INT NOT NULL),
(encr price 1 INT NOT NULL),. . .
where encr price x is a newly generated name. The count col-
umn definition will be processed in the same way, only the
record for this column will contain information about homomor-
phic encryption.
Next, CHECK-constraint will be modified. Processor will
use newly created record to transform CHECK-expression into
the secured form with check if encryption algorithm for price
supports greater-than operation:
CHECK ((encr price 0≥encrypt ord(0)[0])
AND (encr price 1≥ encrypt ord(0)[1]) AND. . . )
where encrypt ord(0) is encrypted values’ vector of 0. Final
query will be:
CREATE TABLE tbl (id INT),
(encr price 0 INT NOT NULL),
(encr price 1 INT NOT NULL),. . . (encr count 0
BLOB),
(encr count 1 BLOB),. . .
CHECK ((encr price 0≥encrypt ord(0)[0])
AND (encr price 1≥encrypt ord(0)[1]) AND. . . )
Let us consider a SELECT query received after table cre-
ation:
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SELECT SUM(count) FROM tbl
Firstly, after parsing, the processor will check if the col-
umn count from the table tbl has its record in cryptographic
metadata storage and its encryption supports additive operation.
A record was created in previous example and encryption is
additive homomorphic for demonstration. Also is considered,
that SUM operation is simple column-wise sum. Query will be
transformed:
SELECT
SUM(encr count 0),SUM (encr count 1),. . .
FROM tbl
The Response processor will detect in DBMS’s response
names of encrypted columns, find appropriate decryptor stor-
age’s record corresponding to that names and decrypts response’s
values from encrypted columns. Processed response will be sent
to user.
5. Cryptographic metadata storage
Section 5 presents functioning cycle of cryptographic metadata
storage and its security. Cryptographic metadata is necessary
for correct modifying of user’s queries as it was shown in pre-
vious sections. Each record for secured columns contains such
information as table and column’s names, encryption type, en-
cryption keys etc. Because of storing encryption keys storage
must be protected.
To ensure security of the storage the following technique
was used. While application is running all metadata are located
in RAM. When a new record is added to the storage the backup
of whole storage is created encrypted with one of encryption
algorithms. Upon application’s shutdown RAM is cleared and
there is last valid encrypted backup in NVRAM. This prevents
an unauthorized access, insider’s malicious actions and power
failure of proxy server.
In addition another advantage of such technique is perfor-
mance of encryption key’s extracting which boost encryption
and decryption activities.
6. Encryptions
This section features description of encryptions that secure cloud
database uses. We use three types of encryption: deterministic,
order preserving and homomorphic encryptions.
Deterministic. Deterministic encryption provides strong secu-
rity, it leaks only which encrypted values correspond to the same
data value. In secure cloud database it can be used for storing
password hashes, when no operations are conduct over data, but
confidentiality is very important.
In proposed solution, we use proprietary developed determinis-
tic block encryption [11].
Order Preserving. Order preserving (OP) encryption allows
order relations between encrypted data items to be established,
without revealing data itself. Such encryption can be used to
protect salaries or other economical information inside secure
database with possibility of performing order operations.
There are various OP encryptions, used in solution. For
different types of data we can use different OP encryptions in
single table; this provides extra resistance to crypto attacks.
Only two encryption schemes will be discussed in this paper.
6.1 Radix encryption
The second scheme’s, based on different number systems, basic
idea is conversion of numbers from notation with one radix to
another.
For the first step, it is necessary to obtain the vector of co-
efficients from number in first-radix representation. Next step
is replacing in the current representation first radix with second
chosen radix. At the last step performed when a subsidiary vec-
tor of nonnegative numbers is added to the vector of coefficients
from the current number representation. Note that values of the
sum of these vectors must be less than second radix and second
radix is greater than first.
Having final representation with new radix and modified co-
efficients the result can be calculated as second-radix – decimal
conversion. The secret key is consist of first, second radixes and
subsidiary vector of nonnegative numbers.
To illustrate this idea, let us consider one iteration of encryp-
tion. There can be made several iterations. Original number is
S ∈ N.
Secret key is:
p,q ∈ N,〈b0,b1, ...,bn−1〉,bi < q,bi ∈ N
Steps of encryption:
1. Obtaining S’s p-radix representation:
s= α0 +α1 ∗ p+α2 ∗ p2 + ...+αn−1 ∗ pn−1
2. Replacing p-radix with q-radix:
s′ = α0 +α1 ∗q+α2 ∗q2 + ...+αn−1 ∗qn−1
3. Adding subsidiary vector 〈b0,b1, ...,bn−1〉 to the vector
of coefficients 〈α0,α1, ...,αn−1〉
s” = (α0 +b0)+(α1 +b1)∗ p+(α2 +b2)∗ p2 + ...
+(αn−1 +bn−1)∗ pn−1
where ∀i : αi+bi < q.
The result of encryption is ω = s′′.
Process of decryption consists of following steps:
1. Obtaining ω’s q-radix representation:
ω = y0 + y1 ∗q+ y2 ∗q2 + ...+ yn−1 ∗qn−1
2. Replacing q-radix with p-radix:
ω ′ = y0 + y1 ∗ p+ y2 ∗ p2 + ...+ yn−1 ∗ pn−1
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3. Subtracting vector 〈b0,b1, ...,bn−1〉 from the vector of
coefficients 〈y0,y1, ...,yn−1〉:
ω” = (y0−b0)+(y1−b1)∗ p+(y2−b2)∗ p2 + ...
+ (yn−1−bn−1)∗qn−1
The result of decryption is , which is equal to S.
Let encrypt a number N= 115 with key (2,3,1,0,2,1,0,1,1)
(one iteration). First step is to transform N to p-radix represen-
tation where p= 2:
S= 115 = 1∗20+1∗21+0∗22+0∗23+1∗24+1∗25+1∗26
Then vector of coefficients is = (1,1,1,0,0,1,1). New radix
is q= 3 and subsidiary vector is B= (1,0,2,1,0,1,1) because
of chosen encryption key. Second and third steps are to add
coefficients’ vector to subsidiary vector.
S” = (1+1)∗30 +(1+0)∗31 +(0+2)∗32 +(0+1)∗33
+ (1+0)∗34 +(1+1)∗35 +(1+1)∗36
= 2075
The number S” is a result of encryption.
Now let us process decryption of found number W . Firstly we
convert this number to numeral system with radix q= 3:
W = 2075
= 2∗30 +1∗31 +2∗32 +1∗33 +1∗34 +2∗35 +2∗36
Next we subtract coefficients’ vector (1,0,2,1,0,1,1) from sub-
sidiary vector (2,1,2,1,1,2,2):
W ′ = (2−1)∗30 +(1−0)∗31 +(2−0)∗32 +(1−1)∗33
+ (1−0)∗34 +(2−1)∗35 +(2−1)∗36
= 1∗30 +1∗31 +0∗33 +1∗34 +1∗35 +1∗36
After that we change radix to p= 2:
W” = 1+20 +1+21 +0+23 +1+24 +1+25 +1+26
= 115
which is origin number N.
The algorithm of encryption is correct and order preserving.
Modification of the considered scheme was used in the imple-
mentation. There are several iterations; also number of bits
for values in the key can be specified in encryption module
configuration.
This encryption has passed multiple tests and following re-
sults were measured:
Speed of encryption 125Mbit/s
Speed of decryption 111Mbit/s
(PC’s configuration: Mobile Dual Core Intel Atom N570, 1666
MHz, 4 GB RAM, OS Windows 7).
Homomorphic. An encryption scheme is called fully homomor-
phic if it’s able to evaluate an arbitrary function over ciphertexts.
In this case decrypted value must match to a calculation result of
the same function over plaintexts. The main feature of scheme
[12] that is used in proposed secure cloud database is ability to
define a strict upper bound of ciphertext size when performing
calculations on it for both addition and multiplication.
7. Conclusion
In this paper solution for ensuring data privacy on an untrusted
database server is presented. Proposed solution achieves this
goal using following key ideas:
• All confidential data, stored in untrusted database, are
encrypted. Neither not-encrypted confidential data nor
encryption keys leave trusted area.
• Modified queries are efficiently executed in DBMS on
encrypted data due to usage of order-preserving and ho-
momorphic encryption algorithms. Trusted proxy server
carries out encryption and decryption operations.
• SQL-processor and response-processor are used to trans-
form incoming queries and database’s responses. Cryp-
tographic metadata storage handles and stores data about
secured columns.
To ensure prototype of solution works properly, it was inte-
grated into WordPress Content Management System. Integration
consisted in redirecting connection with MySQL to prototype
as proxy between WordPress and database. Also markers speci-
fying encryption algorithms were added to initial data scheme.
Tests on queries generated by WordPress show that processing
of queries and DBMS’s responses is correct.
Future development of solution lies in following items:
• Integration with WordPress shows that alias construction
may be required for secured columns in existed program
products. Hence this operation must be implemented in
SQL and response processors.
• Development and improvement existing encryptions. Speed
optimization is one of the most significant goals.
• Security improvement. Interest in analysis of encryption
weaknesses and vulnerabilities [8, 9] is escalating, thus
several measures can be taken to minimize risk of success-
ful security breach. For example, to complicate frequency
analysis, subsystem of phantom “SELECT” queries can
be made in order to average number of queries to each
column. Another idea for improving system’s resistance
to attacks is to add to columns garbage data that will be
detected and ignored during decryption on client side.
This method can change distribution of encrypted data
massive inside DBMS, and as a result can make more
difficult crypto attack on OP encrypted columns.
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